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Abstract 
This article, by applying the ratings of Freedom House, analyzes the 
effectiveness of the European Union’s usage of political conditionality for the 
democratization of the former and current candidate countries, and Southern 
partner countries in the European Neighborhood Policy. Political conditionality is 
the European Union’s main strategy to democratize candidate countries. Due to 
the effectiveness of European Union’s political conditionality all former 
candidates were labeled by Freedom House as liberal democracies before starting 
accession negotiations with the European Union. The European Union’s usage of 
political conditionality with current candidates has led to democratization of many 
practices, such as the protection of human rights, minority rights and different 
cultures. This success is mainly the result of the European Union’s membership 
incentive and, in case of non-compliance, the possibility of high domestic costs for 
candidates. The European Union has also used political conditionality to 
democratize its Southern partner countries through its European Neighborhood 
Policy. However, due to the lack of a membership incentive and domestic costs for 
these countries, political conditionality has not led to democratization, as clearly 
shown in Freedom House ratings for these countries since the introduction of the 
European Neighborhood Policy in 2004.     
Keywords: Political Conditionality, Democratization, Candidate Countries, the 
European Neighborhood Policy, Southern Partner Countries     
AB’NİN DEMOKRATİKLEŞME İÇİN SİYASİ KOŞULLULUĞU 
KULLANMASI: ADAYLAR VE AVRUPA KOMŞULUK POLİTİKASI’NIN 
GÜNEYLİ ORTAK ÜLKELERİ İÇİN BİR DEĞERLENDİRME 
Öz 
Bu makalede, Özgürlükler Evi’nin puanlarına başvurulara keski ve 
günümüzdeki aday ülkelerde ve Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası’ndaki Güneyli ortak 
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ülkelerde Avrupa Birliği’nin siyasi koşulluluk stratejisinin demokratikleşmeye olan 
etkisi analiz edilmektedir. Siyasi koşulluluk Avrupa Birliği’nin aday ülkeleri 
demokratikleştirmede kullandığı temel stratejisidir. Avrupa Birliği’nin siyasi 
koşulluluğu etkin bir şekilde kullanmasından dolayı eski aday ülkeler katılım 
müzakerelerine başlamadan önce Özgürlükler Evi tarafından liberal demokrasiler 
olarak tanımlanmışlardır. Avrupa Birliği’nin günümüzdeki aday ülkeler üzerinde 
siyasi koşulluluğu kullanması neticesinde de bu ülkelerde örneğin insan hakları, 
azınlık hakları ve farklı kültürlerin korunması gibi birçok uygulamada 
demokratikleşme sağlanmıştır. Esas itibariyle, Avrupa Birliği’nin bu başarışı 
siyasi koşulluluğa riayet göstermeleri durumunda aday ülkelere sunduğu üyelik 
teşviki ve riayet göstermemeleri durumunda ise bu ülkelerde ortaya çıkabilecek iç 
siyasi maliyetlerden kaynaklanmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği, siyasi koşulluluğu Avrupa 
Komşuluk Politikası’ndaki Güneyli ortak ülkeler için de kullanmaktadır. Ancak, bu 
ülkelere üyelik teşviki verilmemesi ve iç siyasi maliyetler riskinin bulunmaması 
nedeniyle Özgürlükler Evi’nin puanlarında görüldüğü üzere siyasi koşulluluk bu 
ülkelerde demokratikleşmeye yol açmamaktadır.    
Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasi Koşulluluk, Demokratikleşme, Aday Ülkeler, Avrupa 
Komşuluk Politikası, Güneyli Ortak Ülkeler       
 
Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU), like other 
international actors, such as the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
and the United States, has increased its efforts to promote democratization. The EU 
has used political conditionality as its main strategy to promote democratization in 
both former and current candidate countries, and partner countries in the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP). This paper investigates the effectiveness of EU 
political conditionality on former candidates from Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs)1 which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, Croatia,2 current 
candidates3 and ENP’s Southern partners4.  For this analysis, this study draws on 
the freedom ratings of Freedom House, the leading organization for the 
measurement of democracy levels. The paper, firstly, argues that the EU very 
                                                            
1 In this paper, CEECs refer to the countries which joined the EU in 2004, namely Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, and in 2007, namely Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
2 Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013, is indeed geographically among CEECs. However, due to the 
EU mainly targeted CEECs with the 2004 enlargement, and as part of it with the 2007 enlargement, this 
paper does not put Croatia among CEECs while making its analysis regarding democratization.   
3 Current candidate countries are Turkey, Iceland, Montenegro and Macedonia. However, this paper 
excludes Iceland from its analysis on account of this country’s advanced liberal democratic status 
before applying to EU for membership. 
4 This paper takes into account ENP’s Southern partners as which the EU has implemented Action 
Plans. These are Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory and Tunisia. 
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effectively promoted democratization in the CEECs through political conditionality 
after the introduction of the Copenhagen political criteria in 1993, enabling it to 
achieve the democratization of many practices, such as the protection of human 
rights, minority rights and different cultures, in the current candidates. This success 
has stemmed from the membership incentive (including the threat of exclusion 
from EU membership) for candidate countries to demonstrate compliance with EU 
political conditionality, and high domestic costs, such as the loss of power of ruling 
governments, in case of non-compliance. It is worth mentioning that the EU’s 
contribution to democratization in Europe, including former and current candidate 
countries, was one of the main reasons why it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 2012 (Nobel Prize, 2012). 
On May 1, 2004, the EU experienced the biggest enlargement in its history, 
with the accession of eight CEECs, Malta and Greek Cypriots5.  This enlargement 
gave the EU new neighbors on its external land and sea borders, namely Southern 
Mediterranean countries, Western NIS (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) and 
Russia. In order to avoid various threats, such as international terrorism and illegal 
immigration, related with these new neighbors, the EU had to achieve regional and 
sub-regional cooperation and integration with them, aiming at ensuring political 
stability, enhancing economic development and reducing poverty. Thus, the EU 
created the ENP in 2004. As envisaged by the EU, one of the most significant 
dimensions of the ENP was stimulating democratization in partner countries. To do 
this, the EU decided to apply political conditionality. However, as this paper 
shows, the Freedom House ratings demonstrate that the EU has not achieved any 
gains on this issue in case of its Southern partners since the introduction of the 
ENP. Some of the reasons for this failure were in fact previously predicted by 
Schimmelfennig in 2005 (Schimmelfennig, 2005a: 3). Firstly, the EU has not 
offered any membership incentive to these countries in exchange for making 
democratization reforms. Secondly, although authoritarian governments in these 
countries have been unwilling to introduce democratization reforms, they have not 
faced high domestic costs.  
It is worth mentioning that these reasons explaining the EU’s failure with the 
ENP’s Southern partners do not apply to the ENP’s Eastern partners, which are 
therefore excluded from the assessment given in this paper. The first reason for this 
difference is that, in contrast to its refusal to offer the incentive of EU membership 
incentive to Southern partners, the EU has neither promised nor precluded the 
prospect of membership for the countries involved in the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP),6 introduced under the ENP framework in 2009. Currently Moldova, 
Georgia, which have introduced democratization and free market reforms, and 
Ukraine, which has struggled to integrate with the EU in spite of Russian pressure, 
                                                            
5 As part of this wave of enlargement, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on January 1, 2007, as well. 
6 The EaP is directed at six countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It 
aims to support their political, economic and institutional reforms in line with the EU standards, 
facilitate their trade relations with the EU, and increase the international mobility of their people.   
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discuss to apply for EU membership. In April 2014, the European Parliament (EP) 
recognized, through a non-legislative resolution, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine’s 
right to join the EU if they comply with conditions for candidate status. 
Specifically, the EP’s resolution states that “pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on 
the European Union, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – like any other European 
state – have a European perspective and may apply to become members of the 
Union provided that they adhere to the principles of democracy, respect 
fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights and ensure the rule of law” 
(Europe without Barriers, 2014). The second reason for differences in the EU’s 
effect on ENP and EaP partners is that the argument about the lack of domestic 
costs does not apply to EaP countries, as seen in Ukraine, where Ukraine President 
Viktor Yanukovych’s rejection of the EU’s Association Agreement in November 
2013 led to bloody events in the country.   
This paper begins by explaining the EU’s perception of democracy that it has 
wished to impose through political conditionality on former and current candidates, 
and ENP partners. The second section applies Freedom House ratings to evaluate 
the effectiveness of EU political conditionality on former and current candidates. 
The third section applies the same method to the ENP’s Southern partners. The 
conclusion makes a general evaluation of the study and provides some 
recommendations for the EU regarding how it can more effectively promote 
democratization in current candidates and ENP’s Southern partners.     
1. The EU’s Perception of Democracy and Political Conditionality 
Defining democracy is challenging because there is no universally accepted 
definition. One method is to define it as the fulfillment of free and fair elections. 
Usually applied during the Cold War years, this minimalist method, known as 
electoral democracy, is strongly criticized by current scholars who define it in a 
maximalist manner, as liberal democracy (Yıldız, 2012: 285). One prominent 
liberal scholar studying democracy and democratization, Larry Diamond, argues 
that liberal democratic values include “vigorous rule of law with an independent 
and nondiscriminatory judiciary; extensive individual freedoms of belief, speech, 
publication, association, assembly, and so on; strong protections for the rights of 
ethnic, cultural, religious, and other minorities; a pluralistic civil society, which 
affords citizens multiple channels outside of electoral arena through which to 
participate and express their interests and values; and civilian control of the 
military” (Diamond, 2003: 8; 1999: 10-12).  
According to Diamond the liberal democratic values are effectively measured 
by Freedom House through its annual publication of the “Freedom in the World” 
report (Diamond, 1999: 12). Freedom House, which has significant international 
prestige, has been assessing global political rights and civil liberties in its reports 
since 1972. These reports provide political rights ratings based on the evaluation of 
electoral processes, political pluralism and participation and government 
functioning. Civil liberties are evaluated in terms of freedom of expression and 
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belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy 
and individual rights. The reports give separate numerical ratings from 1 to 7 for 
political and civil liberties in each country, where 1 represents the most free and 7 
the least free. The overall status of countries is defined as the average of the scores 
for political rights and civil liberties in three bands: Free (1.0 to 2.5), means a 
country is a liberal democracy, Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7). The 
survey ratings of Freedom House are very valuable, and used by political scientists, 
human rights defenders, international organizations, civil activists and policy 
makers worldwide. As Fareed Rafiq Zakaria rightfully points out, “while there are 
many sources of economic data, good political data is hard to find. Freedom 
House’s survey is an exception. For anyone concerned with the state of freedom, or 
simply with the state of the world, Freedom in the World is an indispensable 
guide” (Freedom House, 2012a: 38). The ratings of Freedom House are so 
influential that the authoritarian leaders in some countries feel the need to issue 
statements defending the legitimacy of their political regimes against the ratings.   
The most effective way for international actors to promote democratization is 
through conditionality, whereby, if states adopt and maintain certain programs, 
they earn the right to receive political support, economic aid or membership of an 
organization (Kubicek, 2003: 7). Political conditionality in true sense emerged 
after the end of the Cold War to democratize the CEECs. (Stokke, 1995: 9), with 
the EU being the most important actor through its liberal perception of democracy 
that it was able to impose on them applying for EU membership 
(Schimmelfenning, 2005b: 29). Likewise today, candidates have to adopt the EU’s 
liberal democratic values in order to gain membership. The EU has also tried to 
democratize its ENP partner countries in line with these liberal democratic values. 
As we will see, however, in the following sections, whereas the EU successfully 
democratized its former candidate countries and has achieved the introduction of 
many democratic practices in current candidates in line with its liberal democratic 
perception of democracy, it has not succeeded in democratizing the ENP’s 
Southern partners because its policy lacks any EU membership incentive and the 
governing regimes of these partner countries have not suffered domestic costs from 
non-compliance. 
2. The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality on Former and Current 
EU Candidates 
The EU first used political conditionality in rejecting Spain’s application for 
membership. The Birkelbach Report, adopted by the European Parliament in 1962 
in response to Spain’s application, stated that membership of the European 
Economic Community7 was only open to truly democratic countries (Kubicek, 
                                                            
7 The Merger Treaty, which came into force on 1 July 1967, created a single set of institutions for three 
communities, namely the European Economic Community, European Coal and Steel Community, 
European Atomic Energy Agency, which were collectively referred to as the European Communities, 
although commonly just as the European Community. With the came into force of the Treaty on 
European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) on November 1, 1993, the name European Community became 
the European Union.  
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2003: 8). In 1993, with the adoption of the Copenhagen Political Criteria, which 
stipulate that EU membership requires “stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities” (European Council, 1993: 13), the EU powerfully began to impose 
political conditionality on CEECs. After taking the positive opinion of the 
European Commission, the enlargement process started with the Luxembourg 
European Council summit of December 12-13, 1997, when leaders of EU Member 
States reiterated that alignment with the Copenhagen political criteria was a 
precondition for opening accession negotiations with a candidate country. In 
Luxembourg, the EU decided to begin negotiations with several CEECs that had 
fulfilled the political criteria: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia. At the Helsinki European Council summit of December 10-11, 1999, EU 
leaders decided to open accession negotiations with the remaining CEECs: Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. The introduction of Progress Reports 
for CEECs then became the EU’s key instrument for assessing and directing these 
countries democratization. 
The EU effectively imposed political conditionality on the CEECs. One of the 
main reasons why it was effective was the combination of the EU’s promise of 
membership coupled with its threat of exclusion. Another important reason was 
that these countries’ governments were well aware that non-compliance with EU 
political conditionality could carry domestic costs, generally for the government, 
but also for the security and integrity of the country. In this respect, for instance, 
one of the major reasons behind the electoral defeat of authoritarian governments 
in Romania (1997), Slovakia (1998) and Croatia (2000) was these governments’ 
unwillingness to make democratization reforms (Schimmelfenning, 2005b: 29).  
Table 1: Freedom House Ratings for the CEECs (2004 Enlargement) 
Candidate 
Country*  19
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20
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20
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20
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Czech  
Republic - - 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Estonia 2.5 3 2.5 2.5 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Hungary 2 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Latvia 2.5 3 3 2.5 2 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Lithuania 2.5 2.5 2 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Poland 2 2 2 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Slovakia - - 3.5 2.5 2.5 3 3 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Slovenia 2.5 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 
 Source: (Freedom House, 2014a) 
* Malta and Greek Cypriots are excluded from this table as they are not CEECs. It should be noted, 
however, that both of these countries were defined by Freedom House as the most free before the 
determination of the Copenhagen political criteria in 1993.    
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As can be seen from Table 1, all acceding CEECs of the 2004 group, except the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, whose ratings remained the same (and satisfactory) 
between 1993 and 2004, managed to improve their freedom ratings after the 
introduction of the Copenhagen political criteria in 1993. Importantly, before the 
EU started accession negotiations, without exception, all of them were liberal 
democracies according to Freedom House. Among them, however, the EU was 
particularly successful in Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia. As it is put by the EU, each 
candidate country is obligated to strengthen its democracy in line with liberal 
democratic values before the start of accession negotiations if it aims to become a 
full member of the EU (Schimmelfenning, 2005b: 29). Faced with EU political 
conditionality, these three countries, only defined as Partly Free by Freedom House 
before the imposition of the Copenhagen political criteria, became liberal 
democracies before the EU started accession negotiations. As part of the 2004 
enlargement wave, the two CEECs, Bulgaria and Romania, whose membership 
applications were rejected by the EU in 2004, became members on January 1, 
2007, after completing the required reforms in their judicial systems and anti- 
corruption efforts. While the EU effectively promoted democratization in both 
countries, the Romanian case deserves more attention here. As seen in Table 2 
below, while Romania was defined as a Partly Free country before the EU 
introduced the Copenhagen political criteria in 1993, it had become a liberal 
democracy with a Freedom House score of 2.5 by 1996, a year before the EU’s 
adoption of Agenda 2000, in which the European Commission recommended the 
European Council to open accession negotiations with Romania alongside the other 
CEECs.        
Table 2: Freedom House Ratings for Bulgaria and Romania (2007 Enlargement) 
Candidate 
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Bulgaria 2.5 2.5 2 2 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Romania 5 4 4 3.5 3.5 2.5 2 2 2 
Candidate 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  
Bulgaria 2.5 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5  
Romania 2 2 2 2 2.5 2 2 2  
Source: (Freedom House, 2014a) 
Croatia applied for EU membership on February 21, 2003. As a result of the 
positive opinion of the European Commission, the European Council gave 
candidate status to Croatia in June 2004. In December 2004, the European Council 
promised to start accession negotiations on March 17, 2005, so long as Croatia was 
fully cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). However, the lack of Croatian progress on this issue meant 
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that the starting date of negotiations was postponed. Then, after the Chief 
Prosecutor of the ICTY gave a positive report on Croatia’s cooperation, 
negotiations officially started on October 3, 2005, before being successfully 
completed for the parties to sign the Accession Treaty on December 9, 2011. 
Following the ratification of the agreement in Croatia and all EU members, Croatia 
joined the EU on July 1, 2013 (Delegation of the European Union to Croatia, 
2013).         
Table 3: Freedom House Ratings for Croatia (2013 Enlargement) 
 
Candidate 
Country 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 1995 1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 
Croatia 3.5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2.5 2 
Candidate 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Croatia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Source: (Freedom House, 2014a) 
 
Table 3 shows that 2000 was a very significant year regarding Croatia’s 
democratization. That year, Freedom House changed Croatia’s rating from 4 to 2 
and its status from Partly Free to Free following the conduct of free and fair 
presidential and parliamentary elections, efforts to make the state media 
independent of government, and evidence that Croatia’s new leaders were fulfilling 
promises for political, economic and social reform (Freedom House, 2001). Thus, 
Croatia became a liberal democracy according to Freedom House nearly five years 
before the EU started accession negotiations with it. These reforms and the 
country’s subsequent cooperation with the ICTY marked a turning point in 
relations between the EU and Croatia. On the basis of these achievements, the EU 
decided to grant Croatia candidate status in July 2004 (European Commission, 
2004, p. 6). After the start of the accession negotiations on October 3, 2005, 
Croatia continued to implement democratization reforms to get EU membership. In 
2009, for example, improvements in the treatment of its minority Serb and Roma 
communities allowed Freedom House to change Croatia’s rating from 2.0 to 1.5 
(Freedom House, 2010a). 
Currently, the EU has five candidate countries, namely Turkey, Montenegro, 
Serbia, Macedonia and Iceland. Of these, only Iceland has not faced political 
conditionality as it is already an advanced liberal democracy. However, the EU has 
also not imposed political conditionality as effectively on the current candidates as 
it did on the CEECs and Croatia. The reason for this lies first with the creation of 
the concept of “integration capacity”, which means that the EU must first be able 
to function effectively at its present size before engaging in any further 
enlargement. Second, some EU member states, such as France, also now wish to 
hold referenda before accepting any further enlargements. These two developments 
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have decreased the credibility of EU political conditionality on current candidate 
countries because they fear that they may not gain EU membership even if they 
fulfill the Copenhagen criteria (Schimmelfennig, 2011: 919). However, the EU has 
nevertheless managed to democratize many practices in these countries.    
Turkey and the EU have longer history of relations than the other current 
candidates, starting with the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963. After 36 
years of fluctuating relations, the EU declared Turkey as a candidate country in 
1999, and on October 3, 2005, accession negotiations started. Serbia officially 
applied for EU membership in 2009. However, the EU demanded that it fully 
cooperate with the ICTY if it wanted to join the EU. After the capture of Ratko 
Mladić and Goran Hadžić, accused of crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and genocide, the EU granted Serbia candidate status in 2012. In 2013, the 
European Council announced that accession negotiations with Serbia will start by 
January 2014. Macedonia began its rapprochement with the EU in 2000 with 
negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which was 
signed in April 9, 2001, and came into force on April 1, 2004, after three years of 
ratification process. Macedonia submitted its application for EU membership on 
March 22, 2004, and the European Council, after taking the positive opinion of the 
European Commission, granted it candidate status on December 17, 2005. 
However, accession negotiations have been delayed by Macedonia’s ongoing 
disputes with Greece and Bulgaria. In 2006, the parliament of Montenegro 
proclaimed independence from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, before 
applying for EU membership two years later. The European Commission issued a 
positive opinion in 2010 regarding Montenegro’s application. Accession 
negotiation with Montenegro finally started on June 29, 2012.    
Table 4: Freedom House Ratings for Current Candidate Countries 
 
Candidate 
Country 1
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Turkey 3 3 4 5 5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 
Montenegro - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Serbia - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Macedonia - 3.5 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 3 3.5 4 3 
Candidate  
Country 20
03
 
20
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Turkey 3.5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.5 3.5  
Montenegro - - - 3 3 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5  
Serbia - - - 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 2 2 2 2  
Macedonia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  
Source: (Freedom House, 2014a) 
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The EU has had a significant impact on the democratization on many practices 
in Turkey. When Turkey was granted candidate status in 1999, as seen from Table 
4, its democracy rating was 4.5. Due to political conditionality, Turkish 
governments adopted nine harmonization packages between February 2002 and 
July 2004, in addition to comprehensive constitutional amendments in 2001 and 
2004. This EU-inspired democratization process allowed Freedom House to 
change Turkey’s rating in 2002 from 4.5 to 3.5, due to an improved human rights 
framework and reduced restrictions on different cultures (Freedom House, 2003a). 
Freedom House further improved Turkey’s rating in 2004, from 3.5 to 3, 
mentioning as contributing factors the complete overhaul of its penal code, greater 
civilian control of the military, the initiation of broadcasts in minority languages 
and a decrease in the severest forms of torture. Following these reforms, the EU 
rewarded Turkey by starting accession negotiations on October 3, 2005.8 However, 
the definition in the Negotiation Framework Document of these negotiations as an 
“open-ended process”, meaning that Turkey will not automatically become an EU 
member on their conclusion, and the EU’s decision to suspend negotiations with 
Turkey on eight of 35 negotiation chapters in December 2006,9 have significantly 
reduced Turkey’s motivation to initiate further reforms. In 2012, Freedom House 
moved Turkey’s rating back from 3 to 3.5 due to the pretrial detention of thousands 
of individuals, including activists, journalists, union leaders, students and military 
officers, in a series of criminal investigations and trials that many believe to be 
politically motivated (Freedom House, 2013a).  
Serbia submitted its membership application to the EU in 2009. In the same 
year, Freedom House changed the country’s rating from 3 to 2 due to the 
consolidation of a stable multiparty system after several rounds of elections in the 
post-Milosevic period (Freedom House, 2010b). A year after the signing of the 
SAA, in 2002, Macedonia introduced significant democratization reforms to satisfy 
the demands of the Albanian minority in line with the provisions of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement (OFA), signed between the Macedonian government and 
ethnic Albanian representatives on August 13, 2001. The Macedonian government 
eliminated references in the constitution to Macedonia as “the land of the 
Macedonian people”, while the Albanian language was made an official language 
in municipalities where Albanians comprise at least 20 percent of the population. 
These reforms allowed Freedom House to change Macedonia’s rating from 4 to 3 
                                                            
8According to the ratings of Freedom House, among all former and current candidates, Turkey was the 
only exception as being Partly Free country before start of the accession negotiations.  
9Turkey’s reluctance to apply the Additional Protocol to the 1963 Ankara Agreement to Greek Cypriots 
led the European Council to suspend negotiations with Turkey on eight of 35 Chapters. These included 
Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, 
Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External 
Relations. It was also stipulated that no chapter could be provisionally closed until Turkey fulfills all of 
its commitments.   
 
MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES                                                        159 
 
in 2002 (Freedom House, 2003b). Impressed by Macedonia’s commitment to 
implementing the OFA, which significantly contributed to its satisfaction of the 
Copenhagen political criteria, the European Commission, on November 9, 2005, 
recommended that accession negotiations should be started (European 
Commission, 2005). In 2009, Freedom House changed Montenegro’s rating from 3 
to 2.5 due to its successful organization of parliamentary elections in March 2009, 
progress in adopting anti-corruption legislation and an overall stabilization of 
conditions (Freedom House, 2010c). Meanwhile, Montenegrin reforms in 2009 
significantly encouraged the European Commission to issue a positive opinion the 
following year on opening accession negotiations.            
3. The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality on ENP’s Southern 
Partners 
The main reason the EU has developed regional policies is to promote peace, 
economic development and prosperity. The EU considers that this can prevent 
threats such as terrorism, illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking related to 
its periphery countries from affecting Europe. In addition, the EU wants to increase 
the trade and investment opportunities of its economic actors (Smith, 2006: 67- 
70). With this logic, the EU has created several regional policies, such as the 1972 
Global Mediterranean Policy, the 1990 Renovated Mediterranean Policy, the 1994 
European Economic Area, the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (transformed 
into the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008), the 1999 Northern Dimension, the 
2007 Central Asia Strategy, the 2008 Black Sea Synergy and the 2009 Eastern 
Partnership.      
The CEECs accession to the EU in 2004 changed its borders and thus its 
neighbors, which brought both new challenges and new opportunities. Therefore, 
the EU, in addition to its existing regional policies, decided to create the ENP. At 
the Brussels European Council summit of December 12-13, 2003, EU leaders 
approved the “Wider Europe-Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with 
Our Eastern and Southern Neighbors”, prepared by the European Commission. On 
May 12, 2004, the European Commission published the “European Neighborhood 
Policy Strategy Paper”, the main document of the ENP. The ENP was offered to 16 
non-candidate countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Syria and Tunisia. The ENP depends on bilateral treaties in 
which the EU takes into consideration each partner country’s capacities and 
individual requirements. This bilateral approach makes the ENP different from the 
Union for the Mediterranean, which is mainly a multilateral policy.     
With the introduction of the ENP, the EU wanted to offer privileged relations to 
its neighboring countries. The European Commission first published its Country 
Reports for partner countries. In these reports, the European Commission presented 
recommendations as to how to deepen relations by analyzing economic and 
political conditions of the partner countries. After this, Action Plans were prepared 
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for partner countries that took into account the specific requirements of these 
countries. In the Action Plans, the EU decided the short- and long-term reforms (3-
5 years) that it expected the partner countries to fulfill. So far, Action Plans have 
been implemented with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Tunisia and Ukraine since 2005, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Lebanon and Egypt since 2007. Due to their political problems, Action 
Plans have not been published for Algeria, Syria, Libya and Belarus. The European 
Commission also publishes annual Progress Reports for partner countries 
implementing the Action Plans. In order to improve the ability of the ENP to 
encourage democratization and socio-economic reforms, the EU introduced the 
European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 2007 as the 
financial instrument of the policy,10 with 14.9 billion Euros allocated until 2013. In 
May 2010, Stefan Füle, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European 
Neighborhood Policy, announced his satisfaction with the financial dimension of 
the ENP, reporting that in the last five years EU exports to its ENP partners 
increased 63 percent while imports from these partners increased 91 percent. 
However, Füle also stated his dissatisfaction with the implementation of political 
reforms in partner countries (AB Haber, 2010).   
Starting in late 2010, as a result of lingering economic problems, political 
pressures and corruption, citizens in several Arab states rebelled against their 
authoritarian governments, in a movement commonly called the Arab Spring. Their 
protests led to regime changes in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, with narrower political 
reforms also being implemented in other Arab countries. In order to give a positive 
response to the Arab Spring, the EU had to revise the ENP. The new and ambitious 
ENP was put into practice by the EU on May 25, 2011, with the aim of taking 
significant steps to promote civil society and economic cooperation. However, the 
most important point of the new ENP was the introduction of an approach of “more 
funds for more reform” for partner countries in exchange for their introduction of 
democratic reforms. Stefan Füle summarized this approach as follows:  
Increased EU support to its neighbors is conditional. It will depend on progress in 
building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law. The more and the 
faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the 
EU (European Commission, 2011a). 
By adopting this approach, it was clear that the EU aimed to increase the 
effectiveness of its political conditionality strategy on ENP partner countries. 
The EU does not present a specific recipe or model for the reforms that ENP 
partner countries should execute. However, even though reforms differ in each 
country, the EU does require the development of liberal democratic values to 
deepen and sustain democracy in the partner countries, including free and fair 
elections, freedoms of assembly, association, press and expression, rule of law, 
right to a fair trial, efforts against corruption and democratic control of the armed 
                                                            
10With the introduction of the ENPI, the EU abolished its former instruments, the MEDA and TACIS. 
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forces. The EU determines the amount of financial assistance to offer depending on 
how much partner countries introduce these liberal reforms (European 
Commission, 2011b: 3). However, there are two key weaknesses in the EU’s 
political conditionality strategy that it has imposed on the ENP’s Southern partners. 
Firstly, the EU’s usage of political conditionality with the ENP’s Southern partners 
does not include the incentive of EU membership. Therefore, these countries are 
neither excited nor enthusiastic so the EU’s democratization efforts have so far 
failed. As Florent Parmentier puts it, without the ‘golden carrot’ of the incentive of 
EU membership, the EU’s usage of political conditionality is merely “soft 
conditionality” (Parmentier, 2006: 3). In fact, the EU cannot possibly offer this 
incentive due to Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union, which stipulates 
that a country wishing to apply for EU membership must be a European country. 
The second weakness in the EU’s approach to ENP partners is that their 
governments have not suffered any domestic costs for non-compliance with EU 
political conditionality. That is, these governments have remained very relaxed 
because there have is neither societal (civil society) nor institutional (political 
parties) reform pressure in their countries supporting EU-demanded 
democratization reforms.      
Table 5: Freedom Ratings for the ENP’s Southern Partners 
Partner 
Country* 2004 2005     2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Egypt 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5 5.5 
Israel 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Jordan 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Lebanon 5.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4 4 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Morocco 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Palestinian 
Authority- 
Administered 
Territories 
5.5 5 5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6 - -  
West Bank* - - - - - - - 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Gaza Strip** - - - - - - - 6 6 6.5 
Tunisia 5.5 5.5 5.5 6 6 6 6 3.5 3.5 3 
Source: (Freedom House, 2014a) 
* Due to their political problems, the EU has not published Action Plans for Algeria, Libya and Syria.  
Thus, they are excluded from this table. 
** Since 2011, Freedom House has scored the freedom ratings of the Palestinian territories with one 
report for the Gaza Strip and one for the West Bank.  
 
Table 5 clearly shows that EU political conditionality has not promoted 
democratization in the ENP’s Southern partner countries since its implementation 
in 2004. All partners, except Israel, are still rated as Partly Free or Not Free by 
Freedom House. For Egypt, the removal from power of the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces, which assumed power after the military coup that overthrew 
President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, and the subsequent presidential election that 
was almost close to international standards led to Freedom House in 2012 to 
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improve the country’s rating from 5.5 to 5 (Freedom House, 2013b). However, in 
2013, because of the overthrow of the elected president, Mohamed Morsi, the 
military’s increased political intervention, and bloody crackdowns on civil society 
and Islamist political groups, Freedom House reduced Egypt’s rating to 5.5 again, 
placing it among not free countries (Freedom House, 2014b). Freedom House 
changed Jordan’s rating from 4.5 to 5 in 2008 due to many arrests that brought into 
question citizens’ rights to freedom of speech. These cases included a dual French-
Jordanian citizen accused of insulting the king and five journalists accused of 
insulting the judiciary and government officials (Freedom House, 2009). In 2009, 
Freedom House further worsened Jordan’s rating to 5.5. This stemmed from King 
Abdullah’s decision to dismiss the parliament and delay elections until the end of 
2010, as well as the security forces’ increasing influence in political life (Freedom 
House, 2010d). Freedom House improved Lebanon’s rating from 4.5 to 4 in 2009 
because of a reduction in the political violence that it had been severely suffering 
from since 2005, and the introduction of several reforms to overcome sectarianism 
and reduce arbitrary detention (Freedom House, 2010e). Lebanon’s rating, 
however, returned to 4.5 in 2011 because of the government’s violent reaction to 
demonstrators demanding the removal of Hezbollah-backed Najib Miqati as prime 
minister and government officials’ arbitrary detentions of Syrian refugees calling 
for democratization in their own country (Freedom House, 2012b).  
Turning to Morocco, there have been no changes in the ratings since the 
introduction of the ENP in 2004, with the country still rated as partly free, with 4.5 
in 2013. It is not even an electoral democracy as most power is held by the king 
and his close advisers according to Freedom House reports, evaluated the situation 
in the Western Sahara separately. The main democratization challenges facing 
Morocco are as follows: harassment of nonviolent Islamist groups that criticize the 
monarchical system; structural corruption; punishment of journalists who criticize 
the king, his family and the country’s Western Sahara policy; suspensions of 
broadcasting of several visual media and internet sites for critical coverage of the 
Western Sahara issue; intolerance of religious diversity including campaigns of 
arrests of Shiites and Muslim converts to Christianity; violent control of 
demonstrations, in particular those regarding the Western Sahara; and government 
domination of the judiciary (Freedom House, 2013c).  
According to Freedom House, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are not free, 
rated as 5.5 and 6.5 in 2013, respectively. In the West Bank, although President 
Mahmoud Abbas has made some improvements in recent years, corruption remains 
a significant problem. The media are not free in the West Bank as journalists can 
be easily jailed and newspapers easily closed if they publish secret information 
regarding the security of the Palestinian Authority. The West Bank also lacks 
religious freedom because the Basic Law defines Islam as the official religion, 
although the Basic Law requires the maintenance of respect and sanctity for 
Judaism and Christianity. Another major problem of democratization in the West 
Bank is that the judiciary is not independent. The existence of military courts with 
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the authority to impose the death penalty is also a serious problem (Freedom 
House, 2013d).  
Like the West Bank, the Gaza Strip also suffers significant problems of 
corruption, lack of media and religious freedoms, and a non-independent judiciary. 
However, it has worse democratization problems, stemming from Israel’s 
economic blockade and the conflict between Hamas and Israel, which make life 
very hard for Gazans. Firstly, Hamas significantly restricts freedoms of association 
and assembly in the Gaza Strip. For instance, when nearly 500 people protested 
against Hamas after the death of a 3-year-old child in a fire in September 2012 in 
Bureij refugee camp, Hamas forces were quick to disperse the demonstration. In 
2009, the conflict with Israel led Hamas officials to restrict the activities of aid 
organizations and close many civic associations. Secondly, Hamas security forces 
regularly violate human rights by arbitrary detentions and torture. Hamas also 
prevented the Independent Commission for Human Rights, a Palestinian human 
rights ombudsman agency, from entering Gaza’s central prison and Hamas 
detention centers. Thirdly, economic freedom and choice are severely affected by 
Israel’s blockade of Israel, with the only way for Gazans to facilitate economic 
activity beyond Gaza being the use of tunnels, which are frequently bombed by 
Israeli Air Forces, between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. Finally, Gazan women suffer 
stark discrimination in matters of divorce, marriage and inheritance because Sharia 
is the main source of the Personal Status Law (Freedom House, 2013e).                                       
 The only Southern partner of the ENP that has come close to being rated as 
free is Tunisia, although it is worth mentioning here that the Tunisia’s improved 
ratings, from 6 to 3.5 in 2011 and 3 in 2013, did not result from the EU’s usage of 
political conditionality. Rather, this stemmed from the positive impact of the Arab 
Spring in Tunisia. Specifically, the removal of the country’s longtime dictator, 
Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, in January 2011 paved the way for the introduction of 
democratization reforms, with free and fair elections for a transitional Constituent 
Assembly being held in October of the same year. The new government also 
managed to increase freedoms of speech, press, assembly, religious expression and 
academia in the same year (Freedom House, 2012c). Tunisia further introduced 
democratization reforms in 2013 that increased academic freedom, permitted the 
establishment of new labor unions and lifted travel restrictions (Freedom House, 
2014c).     
Conclusion 
This paper analyzed the effectiveness of EU political conditionality on former 
and current candidates and ENP’s Southern partners as measured by changes in 
Freedom House’s democracy ratings for these countries. The analysis shows that 
the EU used political conditionality effectively on CEECs after the introduction of 
the Copenhagen political criteria in 1993. Except the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
whose ratings remained same before and after the EU introduced political criteria, 
before the start of accession negotiations all acceding CEECs of 2004 were liberal 
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democracies according to Freedom House. Among these CEECs, however, Latvia, 
Estonia and Slovakia were particular success stories for the EU. Because, defined 
as only Partly Free countries before the creation of the Copenhagen political 
criteria, they became liberal democracies before starting the accession negotiations. 
As part of the 2004 enlargement, Bulgaria and Romania, the remaining CEECs, 
joined the EU in 2007. As with the other CEECs in 2004, EU, through political 
conditionality, strongly encouraged both of these countries’ democratization, in 
particular Romania’s. While Romania’s rating was 4 before the Copenhagen 
political criteria were created in 1993, defined as a Partly Free country, its rating 
has improved to 2.5 by 1996, defined as a liberal democracy, a year before the 
European Commission adopted Agenda 2000 in 1997, in which it recommended 
that accession negotiations with Romania could start, together with other CEECs. 
EU political conditionality had a transformative impact on Croatian democracy as 
well. Due to its democratization reforms before applying for EU membership, 
Croatia was rated by Freedom House as a liberal democracy in 2000, almost five 
years before the start of accession negotiations, and introduced further 
democratization reforms during its accession negotiations process. Consequently, 
Freedom House almost rated it as among the freest countries shortly before its 
accession to the EU.  
Regarding the current candidates, it is possible to say that the EU has achieved 
the democratization of many practices through political conditionality, notably in 
the areas of protecting human rights, minority rights and different cultures. 
However, political conditionality has not been as effective as it was with the 
former candidate countries. For instance, Turkey and Macedonia are still only 
Partly Free countries according to Freedom House. This is mainly the result of the 
EU’s new “integration capacity” approach, which has discouraged the current 
candidates from initiating further reforms. The credibility of political conditionality 
strongly depends on the EU’s presentation of an obvious membership incentive. 
Thus, the EU should consider abolishing this approach if it wants to promote 
liberal democratic values throughout Europe.                    
The EU has been ineffective to promote democratization in any of its ENP’s 
Southern partner countries through political conditionality since the creation of the 
ENP in 2004. The main reasons for this failure are the lack of any prospect of EU 
membership for ENP’s Southern partner countries and the lack of domestic costs 
for their governing regimes for non-compliance. These two factors have made EU 
political conditionality a defunct strategy. Thus, the EU did not manage to impose 
its maximalist (liberal) perception of democracy on these countries, which still 
remain, according to Freedom House, either not free (Egypt, Jordan, the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip) or partly free (Morocco, Lebanon and Tunisia, though 
the latter, significantly affected by the Arab Spring, made democratization 
reforms). This failure suggests that, instead of political conditionality, the EU 
should try other policies for promoting democratization in its Southern partners. 
First, the EU should abandon its contradictory democratization discourses 
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regarding Arab countries. In particular, there is a serious contradiction in the EU’s 
relative silence regarding the lack of democratization in oil-rich Arab countries, 
such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, which 
diminishes the credibility of its more vocal criticisms of other Arab states. Second, 
because radical Islamists have significant influence with the people in Arab 
countries, the EU should support their integration into legal politics, which would 
melt their power and soften their views about the EU (Boubekeur, 2009: 5-8). 
Third, the EU’s Delegations in Southern partners, by establishing new institutions 
under their structures, can develop mass educational activities to enlighten civil 
society institutions regarding the EU’s liberal democratic values and the European 
experience of democracy.          
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